Hegemony

By Dr Michael Stanford

new perspective Vol 2,  No 3

The essential ingredient of the most modern philosophy of praxis is the historical-political concept of ‘hegemony’.
Antonio Gramsci (1932)

Hegemony - one of the most important, if elusive, concepts
in contemporary social theory.
David McLellan (1995)

BOTH WRITERS ARE CORRECT in stressing the significance for modern thought of the concept of hegemony. (There are several equally correct ways of pronouncing this word: the first ‘e’ may be long or short; the ‘g’ may be hard or soft; the accent may fall on the first or the second syllable.) It is important because it raises the whole question of the role of ideas in political and historical change. Paradoxically, the concept comes from a convinced Marxist.

But, first, what does it mean? It comes from a Greek word meaning ‘to lead’. Gradually, the idea of going first and showing the way gave place to the idea of dominance. Nevertheless, although the term is often loosely used in this latter sense, that is a waste of a good word. It should not be used for domination by physical power; the whole force of the word is to indicate the dominance of ideas - a more subtle and hence valuable concept.

The modern usage comes from the Italian Communist, Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), who was put in prison by Mussolini from 1926 until his death. There he developed theories that made a lasting contribution not only to Marxism but also to political, historical and social theory and practice. What he observed, and steadily insisted upon, was that any major historical change, with the emergence of a new élite, was accompanied by a change in men’s consciousness. Any politically dominant class is also ideologically dominant; that is, it keeps its position because the dominated classes accept its moral and intellectual leadership. Gramsci, himself, saw the idea largely in terms of the Marxist struggle against capitalism, but the notion has much wider implications. Anyone who is concerned with politics, history or social theory finds, sooner or later, the relevance of hegemony. A moment’s thought, for example, about the role of the media in contemporary politics will remind us of the importance of public opinion. Nor is this true only of democracies. Dictatorships go to great lengths to instil their ideas into the populace. In any political coup nowadays the first target is not the presidential palace but the radio and TV station.

But Gramsci is not much concerned (as Lenin was) with such seizures of power. Rather was he interested in the slow, subtle, almost invisible penetration of the moral and intellectual beliefs of the upper class into the minds of the classes below and their acceptance of those ideas, often against their own interests. The working-class man (or, more often, woman) who votes conservative offers a familiar example of hegemony. Was Gramsci, therefore, right to insist that any revolutionary or reformer must change the minds of the masses before gaining power? In his own words:

This implies that there is a close connection between political and intellectual dominance. Which comes first? As we see, Gramsci thought that intellectual power must precede political. But is this always the case? And, if it is, we must ask whether ‘leadership’ is a sufficient or a necessary precondition of gaining power. (We recall that a sufficient condition need not be necessary, nor a necessary one sufficient for the relevant outcome.) And what happens after the gaining of power? Do the ideas of the ruling class continue to prevail over the ideas of all other classes? Do our social superiors set the patterns of our thinking? Are they the same as our political superiors? If we do follow the ideas of our social superiors, is that because they socially superior? Or are they socially superior because they have better ideas - morally and intellectually better? What light does all this cast upon the dominance of the aristocracy in England right up into the twentieth century? Or upon the public school ‘old boy network’?

Hegemony is unavoidable for Marxism; it is either a strong reinforcement of Marx’s theories or a contradiction of them. In an important document, the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx wrote:

This is the classic statement of historical materialism. Does not Gramsci’s notion of hegemony run flatly counter to Marx’s words? Gramsci himself, however, thought that his own ideas improved upon Marx rather than discredited him. He said that the materialism expressed in the words just quoted were not truly Marxist but ‘must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism, and combated in practice with the authentic testimony of Marx.’ This dispute has never been definitively settled; Marxists in the USSR tended to follow the harsher view - that life is determined by material factors; Western Marxists have, on the whole, favoured Gramsci’s view that ideas are at least equally important.

Gramsci, has some very interesting theories about the role of intellectuals, both in revolutionary movements and in society in general. Unfortunately there is no space here to consider them. It is, also, fascinating to look at the many examples in History of groups or classes in societies who owe their power in whole or in part to their intellectual and moral superiority. One may think of the Catholic Church down the ages, and of priesthoods in general. There is the hegemony, up to recent times, in the USA of WASPs - white Anglo-Saxon protestants. There was the British culture in India under the Raj, and the ‘nomenklatura’ of the USSR.

One danger must not be overlooked. If it is necessary to change men’s consciousness before a group can come to power (as Gramsci insists), does not this present a frightful threat to freedom of thought and the independence of our thinking? Remember 1984.

Dr Michael Stanford is the author of Companion to the Study of History, Basil Blackwell, 1994.